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INTRODUCTION

A condition to a land-use permit is invalid if it is insufficiently related or proportionate to the negative effects that would justify denying the permit. Such conditions, or exactions,' may be considered
© Copyright held by the

NEBRASKA LAw REvIEW.

Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law; BA-,
Brigham Young University, 1990; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1993.
1. In the land-use context, an "exaction" is generally considered to be
a condition of development permission that requires a public facility or
improvement to be provided at the developer's expense. Most exactions
fall into one of four categories: (1) requirements that land be dedicated
for street rights-of-way, parks, or utility easements and the like; (2) re*
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extortionate because the government uses the threat of denial to extract some property interest from the owner, rather than simply trying to mitigate the negative public effects of the proposed land use.
The Supreme Court has tried twice to identify a constitutional theory for invalidating extortionate exactions. Although both opinions
were mostly right, neither opinion clearly expressed the essential constitutional objection to extortionate exactions. To make things worse,
many have misunderstood the Court's theories, thereby creating even
more confusion about when an exaction is invalid.
The Court first considered unrelated exactions in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.2 Although people have disagreed about
what Justice Scalia's majority opinion meant to say, I believe the opinion's constitutional theory was essentially right. The Court's main
theory was that proposing an unrelated condition to a land-use permit
changes the purpose of the land-use regulation that would have justified outright denial of the permit. The regulation is no longer imposed
to further legitimate public planning interests, but instead is imposed
to create leverage with which the government can extract property
from the property owner. A land-use restriction imposed for such a
purpose does not "substantially advance legitimate state interests,"
and therefore is a taking that requires just compensation under the
Fifth Amendment.
quirements that improvements be constructed or installed on land so
dedicated; (3) requirements that fees be paid in lieu of compliance with
dedication or improvement provisions; and (4) requirements that developers pay "impact" or "facility" fees reflecting their respective prorated
shares of the cost of providing new roads, utility systems, parks, and
similar facilities serving the entire area.
Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 376 S.E.2d 22, 30 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting
Richard D. Ducker, "Taking"Foundfor Beach Access DedicationRequirement, 30
Loc. GOV'T L. BuLL. 2 (1987)), review allowed by, 380 S.E.2d 768 (N.C. 1989), and
rev'd, 387 S.E.2d 655 (N.C. 1990); see also Daniel S. Huffenus, Dolan Meets Nollan: Towards a Workable Takings Test for Development Exactions Cases, 4
N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 30, 33 (1995) ("Generally, any requirement that a developer
provide or do something as a condition of receiving municipal approval is an
exaction.").
In other contexts, however, "exaction" generally connotes a wrongful condition
to a governmental action. Black's Law Dictionary,for example, defines "exaction"
as "[tihe wrongful act of an officer or other person in compelling payment of a fee
or reward for his services, under color of his official authority, where no payment
is due." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 500 (5th ed. 1979). As one court pointed out,
"[tihe distinction between extortion and exaction, then, is a fine one. Extortion
involves a case in which the person illegally obtains more than is due, when
something is initially due him; exaction involves obtaining something of value
when there was nothing due him in the first instance." Hometowne Builders, Inc.
v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 477 F. Supp. 717, 721 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1979). In this sense,
"extortionate exaction" would be a strange term. Imposing a land-use condition
might be extortion, such as imposing a disproportional condition, or it might be
exaction, such as imposing an unrelated condition, but it couldn't be both.
2. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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Many courts and commentators did not see it quite this way, however. Probably in part to put an end to the confusion, the Supreme
Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard3 tried to inconspicuously substitute a
new constitutional theory while reaffirming the relation or nexus requirement of Nollan. The Court's new theory-presented as if the
Court were simply recounting the theory in Nollan-was that the unrelated exaction is an unconstitutional condition. That is, the unrelated (or disproportionate) exaction, rather than the land-use
regulation that the government offers to relax in exchange, is unconstitutional because it requires a property owner to give up a constitutional right-the right to compensation for taken property-in order
to receive a governmental benefit-the requested land-use permit.
The Court's unconstitutional conditions theory is probably right,
but the Court's earlier theory from Nollan, or at least my version of it,
is more right. The Nollan theory better explains why we object to extortionate exactions, and better prevents extortionate exactions.
Although Nollan could have relied on substantive due process rather
than the Takings Clause, either version of the theory works. An unrelated or disproportionate exaction reveals that the government's only
purpose for applying a particular land-use restriction to a particular
property is to obtain some property interest from the owner, rather
than to harmonize public and private interests by mitigating the negative effects of the requested land use. Such a purpose is illegitimate.
The land-use restriction, not the exaction, therefore takes property
without compensation or deprives the owner of substantive due
process.
Part II of this article recounts the Nollan and Dolan theories for
invalidating extortionate exactions. Part III explains and defends
both the takings and substantive due process versions of the theory.
Part IV then discusses the implications of this theory and its advantages over the unconstitutional conditions theory.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINIONS ON
EXTORTIONATE EXACTIONS
A.

Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission was the first Supreme
Court case to consider exactions. In Nollan, the Nollans had applied
for a coastal development permit to demolish a bungalow and build a
larger house on a beachfront lot. The California Coastal Commission
granted the permit on the condition that the Nollans give the public
an easement to pass along the beach behind the house. 4 After a California court remanded the matter to the Coastal Commission, the
3. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
4. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-28.
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Coastal Commission reaffirmed the exaction based on factual findings
that a larger house on the lot would increase private use of the beach
and create a visual and psychological barrier that would prevent the
public from recognizing and accessing the public beach from the street
on the other side of the houses. 5
In the Supreme Court's majority opinion, Justice Scalia reasoned
that the greater power to deny a land-use permit includes the lesser
power to condition the permit in a way that will mitigate the negative
effects of the requested land use. 6 Thus, if the Coastal Commission
could constitutionally deny a permit to build a bigger house because it
would impair the public's view of the ocean behind the house, then the
Coastal Commission could constitutionally grant the permit on the
condition that the owners give the public some viewing spot or otherwise surrender some property interest to mitigate the effect on the
7
ocean view.
Although the greater does not always include the lesser, this conclusion was certainly right. Of course, the government cannot demand mitigation for every private land use that imposes public costs.
If the government has no right to prohibit a certain land use without
compensation, the government cannot conditionally prohibit the land
use by imposing an exaction either.8 But if the government could prohibit a land use without taking property, then the government surely
can permit the land use on the condition that the owner mitigate the
public costs somehow, rather than denying permission altogether.9
Harmonizing public and private interests in such a way is the essence
of land-use planning.
But even though the Court's conclusion is right, the greater-includes-the-lesser argument is unnecessary to justify exactions. The
Court could have simply observed that such an exaction does not deny
substantive due process or take property from an owner. An exaction
itself will almost never deny substantive due process because it will
almost always be a rational way to pursue some public purpose.1 0
5.
6.
7.
8.

See id. at 828-29.
See id. at 836-37.
See id. at 836.
See James L. Huffman, Dolan v. City of Tigar& Another Step in the Right Direction, 25 ENvm. L. 143, 150-51 (1995). For example, if underlying state law would
not allow a state to prohibit building any permanent habitable structures on
beachfront property without providing just compensation, the state also could not
conditionally forbid building any permanent habitable structures regardless of
the condition. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 102731 (1992).
9. Nollan merely assumed that the Coastal Commission could have denied the permit outright. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-36.
10. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("It is enough
that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.").
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That may be easier to see by supposing that the Coastal Commission
had simply required the Nollans to convey a lateral easement, without
any connection to a development permit. In that case, the Nollans
could not argue that the taking of an easement denies substantive due
process, because obtaining the easement is clearly a rational way to
pursue a legitimate public interest in use of the beach. Requiring the
Nollans to voluntarily convey the easement in order to obtain a permit, rather than just taking the easement, does not make irrational
the Coastal Commission's determination to pursue the public interest
by obtaining lateral easements.
Of course, if the Coastal Commission had just taken the easement,
the Nollans would have had a claim for just compensation even
though they wouldn't have had a claim for denial of substantive due
process. An exaction, on the other hand, is not a taking. If the owner
surrenders a property right to the government, the owner does so voluntarily.ll The owner instead can choose to do without the requested
land-use permit. In Nollan, for example, the Nollans did not have to
give up a lateral easement. They could instead have decided not to
build a bigger house on their land. The government's incentive to voluntarily convey the property does not make the conveyance an involuntary taking.
Justice Scalia's justification of related exactions therefore may indicate that he was anticipating an unconstitutional conditions argument. Even though exactions themselves do not take property or deny
substantive due process, they may be considered unconstitutional conditions because they require the owner to give up a constitutional
right of just compensation in exchange for a governmental benefit, a
land-use permit. 12 Of course, this was the theory that Dolan adopted
to invalidate unrelated or disproportionate conditions. 13 But even a
related and proportionate exaction requires the surrender of a right to
just compensation in exchange for a governmental benefit. So even
though Justice Scalia's greater-includes-the-lesser argument is not
necessary to defend related exactions against substantive due process
or takings challenges, it is necessary to defend them against an unconstitutional conditions challenge.
But even if Justice Scalia meant to defend related exactions
against an unconstitutional conditions challenge, he did not proceed to
11. Cf Meredith v. Talbot County, 560 A.2d 599, 604 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (holding that county did not take developer's property without just compensation, because developer voluntarily agreed to restrict the use of part of the property,
reasoning that "[t]he fact that the decision was made in the face of likely adverse
governmental action is of no consequence").
12. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: UnconstitutionalConditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. Ray.
4, 6-7 (1988) (describing the unconstitutional conditions theory).
13. See infra Part H.B.
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invalidate unrelated exactions as unconstitutional conditions. He did
not say that an unrelated exaction was unconstitutional because it required the owner to give up the right to just compensation in exchange
for a governmental benefit. Instead, Justice Scalia reasoned that imposing an unrelated exaction makes illegitimate the purpose for applying an otherwise legitimate land-use regulation. When an
unrelated exaction is imposed, the only purpose for enforcing the landuse regulation is to extract a property interest from the owner without
paying for it:
The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the
justification for the prohibition. When that essential nexus is eliminated, the
situation becomes the same as if California law forbade shouting fire in a
crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100
to the state treasury. While a ban on shouting fire can be a core exercise of
the State's police power to protect the public safety, and can thus meet even
our stringent standards for regulation of speech, adding the unrelated condition alters the purpose to one which, while it may be legitimate, is inadequate
to sustain the ban. Therefore, even though, in a sense, requiring a $100 tax
contribution in order to shout fire is a lesser restriction on speech than an
outright ban, it would not pass constitutional muster. Similarly here, the lack
of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve
some
14
valid governmental purpose, but without payment of compensation.

The land-use regulation forbidding building a three-bedroom house
without a coastal development permit ordinarily would have undoubtedly been within the government's power. But when the Coastal Commission offered to allow the house in exchange for an unrelated
property interest-the lateral easement along the beach-the Coastal
Commission's purpose for restricting the building of a house could no
longer be the legitimate concerns that would have justified denying
the permit. The larger house would still have all the negative effects
that the Coastal Commission identified, but the Coastal Commission
would accept them if it could extract a lateral easement from the Nollans. At that point, the purpose of the restriction on building the
house must not have been to avoid the negative effect on visual and
psychological access to the beach from the street, but instead simply to
give the Coastal Commission leverage to get an easement without
paying for it.
The land-use regulation forbidding building a larger house without
a permit therefore was a taking because it did not "substantially advance legitimate state interests." 15 The Court did not try to define
what interests are legitimate, but held that a land-use regulation
14. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
15. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), quoted in Nollan, 483 U.S. at

834.
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which is applied only to extract some unrelated property interest from
the owner is undoubtedly illegitimate:
Whatever may be the outer limits of "legitimate state interests" in the takings
and land-use context, this is not one of them. In short, unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the
building restriction
is not a valid regulation of land use but "an out-and-out
16
plan of extortion.

I've described Nollan in a way that more clearly identifies the essential constitutional theory as I see it. Unfortunately, the majority
opinion is not so direct. In fact, parts of the opinion suggest that this
might not have been the Court's theory after all. For example, the
Court's analysis begins by observing that directly requiring the easement would have been a taking, then asks "whether requiring it to be
conveyed as a condition for issuing a land-use permit alters the outcome." 1 7 As I explain more fully below, the Nollan theory as I've described it does not depend at all on whether the exaction would be a
taking if imposed directly.S Furthermore, immediately before the
passage quoted above, the Court talks about circumstances in which
the permit condition would be constitutional,1 9 even though my version of the Nollan theory holds that the underlying land-use restriction, not the exaction, is the unconstitutional act. Even so, the critical
paragraph in Nollan says the constitutional problem is that the "condition" changes the purpose of the "building restriction" so that the
20
building restriction is no longer for a legitimate purpose.
In any event, for my purposes it doesn't really matter whether the
Court understood its opinion as I've described it. The important thing
is that the Nollan opinion at least supports the theory I've described,
and expresses the essential part of the theory. I'll refer to this version
of the theory as the restated Nollan theory, both to acknowledge the
uncertainty about the Court's real theory and to avoid suggesting that
I'm the first to think of it.
B. Dolan v. City of Tigard
Probably in part due to this uncertainty about Nollan's constitutional theory, many courts misunderstood Nollan and often avoided
its effects by narrowly interpreting it.21 Some observers saw the hints
16.
17.
18.
19.

Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (citations omitted).
Id. at 834.
See infra Part V.A.
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836. Some commentators have assumed or argued that
the Court found the condition, rather than the application of the underlying landuse restriction, to be a taking. See, e.g., Huffenus, supra note 1, at 39, 54.
20. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
21. See Richard A. Epstein, Introduction: The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 477, 492 (1995) ("One of the reasons for Dolan was the
hostile response in the lower courts to Nollan. Everywhere you looked the state
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of unconstitutional conditions theory in Nollan and interpreted it as
an unconstitutional conditions case even though Nollan did not express its conclusion in those terms. 22 When the Court decided Dolan
v. City of Tigard about seven years after Nollan, the Court apparently
thought the constitutional theory was too murky and needed to be
clarified.23
Rather than acknowledging the confusion and defending the Nollan theory, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Dolan v. City of Tigard casually reinterprets Nollan as an
unconstitutional conditions case rather than a takings case:
In Nollan ... we held that governmental authority to exact such a condition
was circumscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Under the wellsettled doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right-here the right to receive just
compensation when property is taken for a public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has
little or no relationship to the property. 24

Justice Scalia did not object enough to write a separate opinion, so
maybe he really did mean to follow an unconstitutional conditions theory in Nollan, and the Dolan majority did not think they were changing anything. Or maybe after further reflection they just thought the
unconstitutional conditions theory would work better.
Whatever the reason, Dolan clearly abandons any takings theory
in favor of an unconstitutional conditions theory. Dolan accepts without discussion Nollan's greater-includes-the-lesser argument justifying exactions that serve the same purpose as denial of the permit. 25
But according to Dolan, when the exaction is unrelated, the exaction
rather than the underlying land-use restriction is unconstitutional.
Imposing an unrelated condition is unconstitutional because it conditions a governmental benefit-a land-use permit-on the surrender of
a constitutional right-the right to just compensation for taken property. The same is true, added Dolan, if the exaction is not "roughly
proportional" to the negative impact of the requested land use.2 6
satisfied the essential nexus test. The lower courts worked a pretty thorough
nullification of Nollan, which was dutifully confined to its particular facts:).
22. See Epstein, supra note 12, at 61 ("Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, invoked (in all but name) the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to hold that
this particular bargain between the state and two of its citizens was impermissible because the condition imposed-surrender of the easement-was 'unrelated'
to the legitimate interest used by the state to justify its actions-preserving the

view.").
23. See Richard C. Reuben, Takings at Issue in Land Appeal, A.B.A J., May 1994, at
20 (suggesting that Court granted certiorari in Dolan to resolve uncertainty
about Nollan).
24. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
25. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
26. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
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So, in Dolan, an exaction requiring a dedication of land for a public
greenbelt could not be justified by increased flooding risk, since a private greenbelt would serve the same purpose. 27 Furthermore, the city
could not justify an exaction for a pedestrian and bike path based on
increased traffic from a store expansion, because the city had not
shown that the expansion would create increased traffic roughly proportional to any decrease in traffic resulting from the pathway
28
exaction.
Dolan still did not end the confusion over the essential constitutional theory, however. Despite the Court's clear declaration of its
theory, some have interpreted Dolan as holding that an unrelated or
disproportional exaction is a taking rather than an unconstitutional
condition. 2 9 Dolan did talk about the Takings Clause, of course, because the premise of the unconstitutional conditions theory is that one
has to surrender some particular constitutional right in order to obtain a discretionary governmental benefit. In this case, that right was
the right to just compensation. The Court therefore necessarily observed that the Takings Clause applies to states by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3 0 The Court also necessarily discussed whether the exacted property interests, if taken directly, would be takings requiring
just compensation.31 If they would not be takings when imposed directly, then the owner would not be surrendering any constitutional
right if she chose to comply with the condition. But the Court never
said that an exaction itself may be a taking even though the owner is
not compelled to surrender her property to the government. 32 Rough
27. See id. at 393 ("The city has never said why a public greenway, as opposed to a
private one, was required in the interest of flood control.").

28. See id. at 395 ("[The city has not met its burden of demonstrating that the addi-

29.

30.
31.
32.

tional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by petitioner's development
reasonably relate to the city's requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement.").
See Jan G. Laitos, Causationand the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine: Why
the City of Tigard'sExaction Was a Taking, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 893, 893, 904-08
(1995) (arguing that Dolan did not actually rely on unconstitutional conditions
theory); Terri L. Lindfors, Note, Property-RegulatoryTakings and the Expansion of Burdens on Common Citizens, 24 WM. MrrcHELL L. Rav. 255, 271 (1998)
("In Dolan, the Supreme Court also held that a taking occurred where the state
conditioned the issuance of a building permit on the landowner's agreement to
establish a pedestrian and bike path on a portion of her property."); L.K.S. Rath,
Note, Dolan v. Tigard. A Further Step Toward Full Recognition of Property
Owner Rights, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 337, 349 (1994) ("Dolan takes this trend further, holding that even where the land use regulation serves a legitimate public
purpose and meets the essential nexus test of Nollan, it may still be a taking if
the required exactions are not proportional to the impact of the proposed
development.").
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 n.5 (1994).
See id. at 383-85.
An exaction itself could be a taking only if it left the owner with no alternative
that would not involve a taking. That is, it could be a taking only if the denial of
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proportionality between the exaction and the potential impact of the
proposed land use simply shows that the condition really was a
"lesser" regulation included within the "greater" regulatory power to
deny the permit altogether. As Nollan had explained, if a condition is
just a way to mitigate negative effects of a land use without denying it
altogether, then imposing the condition is an inherent part of the
power to deny. But otherwise it is a separate regulatory condition,
which, as Dolan held, may be an unconstitutional condition if it requires surrendering the right to just compensation.
III. IN DEFENSE OF THE RESTATED NOLLAN THEORY
Despite some criticism of Dolan's unconstitutional conditions theory,3 3 the theory does prevent at least some extortionate exactions as
long as the law accepts the unconstitutional conditions doctrine at
all. 3 4 It's not a wrong theory to support the nexus and proportionality
requirements, it just isn't as good as the alternative theory. The unconstitutional conditions theory invalidates exactions because of what
the property owner gives up rather than how the city uses its power.
That is, the owner is coerced into surrendering a constitutional right
to compensation in order to obtain a governmental benefit. But extortionate exactions are offensive not because of what the city demands
from the property owner, but because the city uses its land-use regulation power as leverage to fflfll those demands. Extorting value from
property owners seems wrong regardless of what type of value the city
extorts. The restated Nollan theory identifies the essential constitutional objection to unrelated or disproportionate conditions.

the permit would so impair the value or use of the property that the denial would
also be a taking. In that case, the government simply gives the owner a choice
between two takings: the owner can choose to surrender the exacted property
interest, or the owner can choose to surrender the permit. But if denial of the
permit would not be a taking, the owner's choice to convey property to the government cannot be a taking.
33. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Leading Cases, 108 HAnv. L. REv. 290,
296-97 (1994) (criticizing Dolan for adopting unconstitutional conditions theory
without explaining what exactions would be takings in the first place).
34. Many have questioned and criticized the unconstitutional conditions theory generally, see, e.g., Laitos, supra note 29, at 893-94, so the restated Nollan theory
may be superior simply because it is based on at least slightly less debatable
principles. However, in this article I will not discuss whether the unconstitutional conditions theory is valid generally. I assume that it is a legitimate constitutional doctrine.
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Land-Use Restrictions Are Uncompensated Takings
or Deny Substantive Due Process If They Do Not
Substantially Advance Legitimate State Interests

The essential constitutional objection is that a government imposing unrelated or disproportionate conditions is not using its regulatory
power to substantially advance legitimate public interests in land-use
planning. A land-use restriction that does not substantially advance
such interests is an uncompensated taking, or a denial of substantive
due process.
By my account, this was the theory for invalidating unrelated exactions in Nollan, except that Nollan relied only on the takings version
of the theory. Both the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause
work, as I'll explain in the next subpart. But for now assume that
both clauses may be violated by a land-use regulation that does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests. The Supreme Court
has said as much. In Nectow v. City of Cambridge,35 the Court held
that the application of a zoning law to a particular property violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it did
not "bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare." 36 Similarly, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,37 the Court
held that "[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular property" may be a taking for basically the same reason: if the application
"does not substantially advance legitimate state interests."38
Ordinarily the government has wide discretion in applying landuse regulations. In Nollan, the Coastal Commission could have simply denied the land-use permit in order to preserve visual access to the
beach, as the Court assumed. 3 9 Similarly, the City of Tigard ordinarily could have constitutionally denied a permit to pave a parking lot
because of flooding concerns or to build a bigger store because of traffic
concerns. A court will generally defer to the permitting authority's
judgment about what land uses to allow, as long as the court can perceive some rational basis for the decision.
A related and proportionate exaction does not change the character
of the government's ordinarily permissible actions. For example, a
city might deny a permit to expand a business because of resulting
traffic congestion, but decide that the congestion will not be so great as
to require denial if the owner will dedicate property for a road expansion that will keep traffic congestion at an acceptable level. The exaction actually confirms the legitimate purpose of the conditional denial:
the city will deny the permit if it creates too much congestion, but will
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

277 U.S. 183 (1928).
Id. at 188.
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
Id. at 260.
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1987).
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allow the permit if the owner agrees to fulfill a condition that can reduce the congestion. A related and proportionate exaction thus is an
accommodation of private property interests, intended to allow the
owner to use her property consistent with planning goals. As I explained above, a related and proportionate exaction is also clearly
within the government's power to impose. 40 It does not take any property from the owner, because the owner may reject the condition and
go without the permit. Any dedication of property is voluntary. And it
does not violate substantive due process because the government
surely has a rational reason to acquire the property interest.
But an unrelated exaction does not just reduce or eliminate the
negative effects of the owner's proposed use. Such an exaction thus
reveals the government's true purpose for conditionally denying the
land-use permit. Although the government might have denied the
permit for some rational and legitimate reason, it didn't. Instead, the
government told the owner that it would accept the negative effects of
the requested land use as long as the owner would convey some property interest to the government. For example, in Nollan the Coastal
Commission presumably could have denied the permit to preserve the
view of the ocean. But the Coastal Commission didn't. Instead, the
Coastal Commission would allow the view to be impaired as long as
the Nollans would give the public a lateral easement along the beach.
If the Nollans were to reject the condition, the Coastal Commission's
own actions would clearly reveal that its reason for denying the permit would not be because a bigger house would impair the view, but
because the Nollans would not give them a lateral easement. Once
the condition was imposed, the only remaining reason why the permit
did not immediately issue was that the Nollans had not given the
Coastal Commission a lateral easement.
Even though some might say that imposing an exaction is an approval of the permit, subject to conditions, a conditional approval is
also a conditional denial. The reality is that when a government imposes a condition, it has at that moment applied a land-use regulation
to prevent the owner from using her property in some way. If the condition is unrelated, then the government has forbidden the owner to
use her property as requested unless and until she surrenders some
property interest to the government. If the owner does not fulfill the
condition, then the denial will be permanent. But either a conditional
or a permanent denial is invalid from the start if the government restricts property use for an illegitimate reason.
While a court ordinarily will accept any possible rational reason for
a regulation, in order to avoid intruding into and second-guessing the
government's deliberations, the government's own actions tell the
40. See supra Part I.AL
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court exactly what the reason for the denial is. That reason-a property owner's refusal to convey property to the government-is not a
legitimate state interest justifying a land-use regulation. A government authority may restrict land uses for many legitimate reasons
concerning public welfare, and probably in most cases it could justify
either granting or denying a permit. But the government may not restrict someone's use of her land simply because she won't give the government some property interest that the government would like to
have.
Nollan's analogy to a free speech restriction also illustrates this
theory. Again, Justice Scalia wrote that when an exaction is
unrelated,
the situation becomes the same as if California law forbade shouting fire in a
crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100
to the state treasury. While a ban on shouting fire can be a core exercise of
the State's police power to protect the public safety, and can thus meet even
our stringent standards for regulation of speech, adding the unrelated condition alters the purpose to one which, while it may be legitimate, is inadequate
to sustain the ban. Therefore, even though, in a sense, requiring a $100 tax
contribution in order to shout fire is a lesser restriction
on speech than an
41
outright ban, it would not pass constitutional muster.

In this example, the restriction on speech would be constitutional by
itself. But when the government offers to waive the restriction in exchange for cash, the government reveals that its purpose for the restriction is really to make money. The condition thus "alters the
purpose" of the speech restriction to one which "is inadequate to sustain the ban."42 The speech restriction itself therefore becomes invalid because the only reason the restriction is enforced against any
particular person is that the person will not give the government
$100.43
Although the analysis is a little more complex, the same theory
applies to disproportionate conditions. A disproportionate condition
might eliminate the negative public effects of the requested land use,
but it also gives the government some significant additional advantage that it otherwise would have to acquire by purchase or condemnation. The government in effect declares that it denies the land-use
41. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
42. Id.
43. This speech restriction example is another indication that Justice Scalia might
not have clearly resolved the constitutional theory in his own mind. He first declares that the ban on shouting fire becomes invalid because the purpose of the
ban is inadequate to sustain the ban. This clearly expresses the substantive due
process or takings theory I've described. But then in the very next sentence Justice Scalia suggests that the condition, rather than the underlying ban, would not
"pass constitutional muster." Id. Maybe Justice Scalia was just not being precise, but the last quoted sentence nonetheless supports those who perceive Nollan
as an unconstitutional conditions case, since that would be the only theory to
invalidate the condition rather than the underlying regulation.
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permit unless and until the owner gives the extra value to the government, even though the permit would not have any negative effects
once the owner gave up a proportionate concession. The government
thus is not simply harmonizing public and private interests. Presuming that the owner would convey a proportionate interest to mitigate
the negative impact of her development, the government nonetheless
prospectively denies the permit if the owner will not convey something
more. Again, the government's own actions reveal its true, illegitimate reason for applying the land-use regulation to the owner's
property.
Of course, judging causal relationships or determining the extent
of a land use's impact on planning interests can be difficult. A government may intend to reduce the actual negative impact of a requested
land use, only to discover that the owner or a court thinks the government has gone too far. That is why the condition only needs to have
some "nexus," rather than being directly related, and why it only
needs to be "roughly" proportional, rather than directly proportional.
Those requirements should be applied in light of this purpose: to determine when a government has not legitimately exercised its regulatory power to harmonize conflicting goals, but instead to extort value
from property owners. It may be hard to judge sometimes whether a
condition is just imprecise or whether it actually extorts something
extra from the owner. But when a condition does demand something
extra, the government's decision goes beyond just advancing the legitimate state interest in mitigating negative effects of a requested land
use.
It might seem that as long as the exacted property furthers legitimate state interests, the government is indeed using its police power
properly. But the purpose or benefit of the extorted value does not
change the nature of the regulatory action that allowed the government to obtain that value. If a condition is unrelated or disproportionate, the government has made the decision to grant or deny a permit
not because of the permit's own effect on planning goals but because of
what the government might acquire by threatening to deny the permit. The government thus intended its permit requirement in that
particular case, as well as its prospective, contingent denial of a permit, to create exchange value, not to advance planning interests. Such
an unconstitutional land-use action does not become constitutional
just because the government uses the resulting leverage or exchange
value to acquire interests that further land-use planning goals rather
than entirely different public interests. If the government simply
threatened to falsely accuse and imprison someone unless she surrendered some property interest to the government, the government's legitimate need for and use of the property would not make the threat of
imprisonment legitimate. Regardless of what the government ex-
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tracts from the owner, the government made its planning decision to
conditionally deny the permit for an impermissible reason: because
the owner would not surrender some property that the government
wanted.
B.

Substantive Due Process or Takings

This reasoning works whether the underlying regulation is invalidated for taking property without just compensation or for denying
substantive due process. The essential point is simply that when an
unrelated or disproportionate exaction is imposed, the underlying regulation is enforced for an illegitimate reason.
1.

Takings

The Supreme Court's decisions clearly support the theory that a
land-use regulation is a taking, not just a deprivation of due process, if
it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests. Early
zoning opinions, however, did not say that such land-use regulations
are takings. Instead, the Court at first simply applied the substantive
due process requirement that a land-use regulation, like any other
governmental regulation, must be "reasonably necessary" to accomplish some legitimate governmental purpose. 44 A couple of years after
the Court first approved zoning generally in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,45 the Court in Nectow v. City of Cambridge46 held that
the application of a zoning law to a particular property violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court explained that
[tihe governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general
rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does
not bear4 a
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
7
welfare.

The lower court had found that the particular restriction would not
further the public welfare at all because the strip of land was useless
for residential purposes and was bordered by commercial uses.
Although the Court stressed that ordinarily it would not substitute its
judgment of the public welfare for the judgment of the zoning authorities, the Court held that since the lower court had found that the restriction would not serve any public purpose at all in this case, the
48
restriction violated the Due Process Clause.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
277 U.S. 183 (1928).
Id. at 188.
See id. at 188-89.
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Since Nectow, however, the Court has clearly said that a land-use
restriction that does not substantially further such public interests is
a taking, regardless of whether it also denies substantive due process.
This evolution may have begun by mistake, with two decisions that
apparently misunderstood Nectow.49 In Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City,50 the Court cited only Nectow in support of its
brief observation that "a use restriction on real property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose."51 Then in Agins v. City of Tiburon52 the
Court again cited only Nectow in support of its statement that "[tihe
application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests."5 3 This time the Court's statement was not just a passing
dictum, however. The Court went on to hold that the zoning regulation was not a taking because it substantially advanced a legitimate
state interest in protecting residents from the "ill effects of
urbanization."54
In Nollan the Court reaffirmed this takings principle and for the
55
first time expressly distinguished it from due process requirements.
Justice Brennan argued in dissent that the Takings Clause does not
create a separate standard for determining "whether an exercise of
the police power is legitimate." 56 Although he acknowledged that
cases like Agins expressed the standard differently, he maintained
that those cases still expressed a single standard for testing the legitimacy of actions under the police power. 57 The majority disagreed,
however, and insisted that the Takings Clause does create a separate
standard, and that standard is not identical to the due process
standard.5S
This disagreement involves two separate issues. First is whether a
land-use regulation that does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests is just a deprivation of substantive due process or
whether it is also a taking. Second is whether the standards are different: whether a land-use regulation might be rational enough to
49. See Jerold S. Kayden, Land-Use Regulations, Rationality, and Judicial Review:
The RSVP in the Nollan Invitation (PartI), 23 URn. LAw. 301, 313-16 (1991)
(tracing connection between Nectow and later takings cases).
50. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
51. Id. at 127.
52. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
53. Id. at 260.
54. Id. at 261.
55. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) ("We have
long recognized that land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substan).
tially advance[s] legitimate state interests' ....
56. Id. at 843 n.1.
57. See id. at 843-44 n.1.
58. See id. at 834 n.3.
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satisfy substantive due process, yet still be a taking because it does
not "substantially advance legitimate state interests."
As for the first issue, the Nollan majority was right to recognize an
independent takings standard. Even though the Court may have mistakenly extracted the takings standard from due process cases, without justifying an independent takings standard, a land-use regulation
that denies substantive due process may also be a taking for the same
reason. Any land-use restriction takes from a land owner some right
she otherwise would have in her property. Despite the accepted
breadth of the police power, the government does not own the "lesser"
property rights that the government's zoning laws can take from an
owner without compensation. 59 The police power under which Euclid
justified zoning simply overrides property rights protected by the Due
Process Clause; it does not extinguish them or give them to the government. 60 If the government does not choose to exercise its police
power to constitutionally restrict a certain property right, the property
owner, not the government, continues to have that right and may assert it against others. For example, if the government does not use its
police power to prevent paving a parking lot, then the property owner
retains the right to pave her parking lot to the extent the common law
allows.
Therefore, a land-use restriction that is not within the police
power, because irrational and unconnected to any legitimate public
need, does not change the owner's property rights. If the restriction is
enforced, it is simply an arbitrary taking of some property right that
still belongs to the land owner, even though the government could
take away that right without compensation if it did so for some rational reason. At least as long as the regulation satisfies other criteria
defining a taking, a regulation that ordinarily would be an uncompensable restriction on land use is a compensable taking if it does not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest.
However, this observation is pointless if the "substantial advancement" standard is identical to the substantive due process standard.
A regulation can be a taking only if it is for "public use."61 The Court
has held that any regulation satisfying substantive due process is for a
"public use" under the Takings Clause. 6 2 Therefore, if the takings and
due process standards are the same, then any regulation that does not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest is also not for a pub59. See Epstein, supra note 12, at 60 ("Yet even this broad construction of the police
power does not give the state ordinary ownership rights over the property that it
may restrict or regulate.").
60. See id. at 59 ("The police power addresses the set of justifications that the state
must put forward in order to override any of the substantive protections of the
Constitution.").
61. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
62. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
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lic use, and cannot be a taking at all. It is simply invalid under the
Due Process Clause.
There is reason to think that the police power standards for overriding the Takings Clause should be different from those overriding
the Due Process Clause, or in other words, that a regulation might
provide substantive due process yet require just compensation because it does not "substantially advance legitimate interests." This
might have been why the majority preferred the takings theory in Nollan, since a takings theory seemed to more easily justify what seemed
like closer "scrutiny" of the connection between means and ends than
the Due Process Clause generally allows.
A couple of Supreme Court cases before Nollan hinted that the
standards were identical. In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp.,6 3 the Court said that "it would be surprising indeed" if Congress had taken the assets of employers in cases where the Court had
held that the congressional actions did not violate the Due Process
Clause. 64 Earlier, in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,65 the Court
seemed to assume that a land-use action that did not deny due process
would also not unconstitutionally take property by regulating without
substantially advancing a legitimate state interest. 66 But the majority in Nollan concluded "that assumption is inconsistent with the formulations of our later cases" and that the Takings Clause does indeed
create an independent and different standard.67
The main reason the verbally similar standards might differ in effect is that the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause protect
different interests. Substantive due process essentially imposes an
absolute limitation on governmental power. The government can
never arbitrarily or irrationally take some action that deprives a citizen of life, liberty, or property. Substantive due process therefore only
tries to identify governmental actions that are so arbitrary and unconnected to any legitimate public purpose that they are beyond the government's power. The Takings Clause, on the other hand, does not
absolutely limit governmental power to take actions affecting property. Rather, it determines whether a governmental action is the sort
of restriction that all citizens must accept as part of living in an ordered society, or whether it uniquely burdens a certain citizen so that
society should share the cost by having government provide compensation.6 8 Since all takings must satisfy substantive due process in or63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

475 U.S. 211 (1986).
Id. at 223.
369 U.S. 590 (1962).
See id. at 596.
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.3 (1987).
See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) ("One of the principal
purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
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der to be for "public use," the just compensation requirement of the
Takings Clause divides permissible governmental intrusions on property into two subsets: those that require compensation and those that
do not.
As the substantial advancement standard indicates, a regulatory
burden may be unique because of the reason for the burden rather
than the extent of the burden. That is, if a regulation does not advance certain interests-referred to vaguely as "legitimate state interests"-then it may unfairly burden some owners even though in the
due process context we would not consider the purpose for the regulation to be "illegitimate." In other words, "legitimate state interests"
may be only a subset of the governmental purposes that satisfy substantive due process, which include broadly "the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare." 69 If so, the takings standard would consider some permissible land-use regulations to be takings because
they do not further the "legitimate" purposes that override the just
compensation requirement, even though they do further some public
purpose that satisfies the substantive due process requirement. In
that way the takings standard would be higher than the due process
standard, because courts would look at a narrower range of interests
that a regulation may advance without requiring compensation.
Defining that narrower range of interests might be so difficult,
however, that courts have to accept any purpose that would ordinarily
justify an exercise of the police power. The Supreme Court has not
tried to define what interests are legitimate under the takings standard. In fact, Nollan suggests that legitimate state interests might
include all permissible purposes for governmental action. The majority observed:
Our cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a "legitimate state interest" or what type of connection between the regulation and the state interest satisfies the requirement that the former
"substantially advance" the latter. They have made clear, however, that a
broad range 7of
governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these
0
requirements.

Besides referring to the broad range of such purposes, the opinion
cites Euclid, among other cases, which considered a due process challenge but not a takings challenge. 71 This further suggests that any
permissible purpose for governmental action is also a legitimate state
interest.
On the other hand, the purpose of the Takings Clause might help
define a subset of public purposes that are "legitimate." Since the
the public as a whole.'" (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960))).
69. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
70. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35 (footnote omitted).
71. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384, 386 (1926).
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Takings Clause tries to identify regulations that unfairly burden individuals, legitimate state interests might include only those that by
their nature do not create unique, inequitable burdens for particular
individuals. The government may legitimately impose unique burdens on individuals when those burdens mitigate public harms or
costs that the individual has caused. 7 2 The government also may impose burdens that are not unique at all. That is, the government may
legitimately pursue regulatory purposes that are inherently reciprocal, in which all are subject to a comprehensive scheme and the regulation of each person inherently benefits the others who are
regulated. 7 3 Zoning laws, for example, generally further planning interests that restrict all property. They cannot impose identical limitations on every parcel of land, of course. Industry must be allowed in
some areas, but not in others. But even though only some areas are
subject to particular limitations, all property is generally subject to
the same governmental activity: deciding what land uses are best
suited for what areas in light of public safety, health, economic welfare, and other concerns. If a particular land-use restriction is part of
a comprehensive and reciprocal effort to coordinate land uses for the
collective good, then it substantially advances a legitimate interest
even though not every other property owner is subject to the restriction. Every other property owner is still subject to land-use regulation
generally.7 4 On the other hand, if a land-use restriction does not further those general planning purposes, then the restriction is not reciprocated and applies uniquely to the property owner. In that case, the
public should share the burden imposed on the owner by sharing the
loss or expense, since the public has not already shared the burden by
subjecting themselves to reciprocal burdens, and since the owner did
not create the burden.
This principle is still vague, however, and may not solve the problem of defining legitimate interests. For example, a taxation scheme
would have to be considered legitimate, yet the taxation of one person
does not inherently benefit another taxed person. The taxation benefits another only if the government chooses to spend the money in a
72. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("Since the owner's use of the property is (or, but for
the regulation, would be) the source of the social problem, it cannot be said that
he has been singled out unfairly.").
73. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (justifying and
distinguishing a land-use restriction that "secured an average reciprocity of
advantage").
74. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133-36 (1978)
(declaring that landmark preservation law, like zoning laws generally, did not
unfairly burden landmark owner because owner enjoyed reciprocal benefits along
with the rest of the public, even though many owners were not subject to
landmark restrictions).
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way that benefits the other. One might say, then, that any actually
reciprocal regulatory purpose, rather than any inherently reciprocal
purpose, is legitimate. But that definition could include all sorts of
apparently illegitimate purposes. Even openly extortionate regulations would satisfy this standard as long as the government applied
the regulations to everyone, then used the profits from its extortion for
public purposes. So even though theoretically a narrower range of interests may justify regulation without compensation, defining that
range may be hopeless.
The different purposes of the Takings Clause and the Due Process
Clause also suggest, although perhaps more weakly, that courts
should examine more closely whether a regulation actually furthers
the legitimate purpose: in other words, that a regulation might be a
"rational" means to achieve a legitimate purpose, yet not "substantially advance" the purpose. Nollan argued that the standards are different simply because of the different words used,75 overlooking that
the substantial advancement language originated in due process
cases. 76 Dolan argued by analogy to other constitutional rights, concluding that "[wie see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a
poor relation in these comparable circumstances." 77 This is probably
the best explanation. There may not be any reason why courts should
examine official actions for uncompensated takings any more closely
than they examine official actions for violations of other constitutional
rights. But once the Takings Clause standard is clearly differentiated
and separated from the Due Process Clause standard, there does not
seem to be any reason why courts should examine official actions less
closely either. The substantive due process standard is uniquely deferential because it defines the outer limits of permissible governmental power and requires a court to second-guess whether a regulation
was a reasonable way to try to achieve some public purpose. But requiring the government to compensate an individual for the costs of
regulation is less drastic and does not actually declare limits on the
government's power to act. The Takings Clause therefore does not require the same caution and deference. Instead, the right to compensation might be considered like any other constitutional right, and
therefore involve the same type of examination.
Even if the substantial advancement standard is discrete and different from the substantive due process standard, the takings version
of the restated Nollan theory may invalidate the underlying regulation only when the regulation interferes with the property enough to
75. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.3 (1987).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 44-54.
77. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
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be a taking on its own. This is not true if a complete deprivation of a
discrete property right is always a taking, however minor compared to
the value of all the owner's property rights, as some have suggested.78
The Court's few cases stating the substantial advancement principle
have not suggested that a land-use regulation that does not substantially advance legitimate state interests is a taking only if the regulation also deprives the owner of some threshold degree of the entire
property's value. On the other hand, it hasn't elaborated much on the
principle at all. In general, the Takings Clause
does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In
deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this
Court focuses rather both on the character ofthe action and on the
nature and
79
extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.

Sometimes, however, a regulation may be a taking even when it
doesn't substantially impair the "parcel as a whole," such as when the
regulation is essentially a "permanent physical occupation of property."8 0 Similarly, a regulation that does not substantially advance a
legitimate state interest might always be considered a taking, regardless of its effect on the whole, because the reason for viewing the parcel as a whole is to avoid invalidating reasonable restrictions on
property that are justified by the police power. If a police power justification for a land-use regulation does not override the protections of
the Takings Clause, then the restriction should be a taking regardless
of its effect on the whole.
But if the whole parcel approach were followed in this context,
even a completely arbitrary land-use regulation would not be a taking
if it did not substantially impair the value of the property and was not
the sort of "physical invasion" that may be a taking regardless of a
relatively small impact. The arbitrary regulation would still deny
substantive due process, however. For example, suppose a city zoning
ordinance imposed certain aesthetic standards, like allowing only certain building materials or colors. The city offers to waive those standards if the owner will convey a public easement or some other
unrelated property interest. Even when enforced for an illegitimate
reason, so that the police power does not override the protections of
the Takings Clause, the zoning ordinance still might not interfere
78. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) (acknowledging that Court has not clearly decided what property interest a loss of
value should be measured against); RIcHARD A. EpsTns, TAKINGS: PIVATE PRoPERTY AND THE POWER OF EzsuENT DomAn ch. 5 (1985) (arguing that any unjusti-

fied restriction on property is a taking); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal
Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88
COLUmM.
L. REV. 1667, 1678 (1988) (identifying Supreme Court's trend towards
severing property rights in determining whether a taking has occurred).
79. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
80. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982).
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with the owner's property enough to be considered a taking. But the
application of the ordinance would deny substantive due process because the city's actions clearly reveal that the city's only reason for
enforcing the ordinance was illegitimate.
2.

Substantive Due Process

Such qualifications and complexities may make the substantive
due process version of the restated Nollan theory preferable. The substantive due process version could invalidate an exaction whenever
the takings version would, while avoiding debate about whether there
is an independent takings standard and whether the land-use regulation is a taking only if it also reaches a certain threshold of interference with property.S1
Although it is theoretically sound, the problem with the substantive due process theory is that it relies on substantive due process.
The contemporary reluctance to rely on substantive due process-if
not outright repudiation of the doctrine 82-may explain why Nollan
tried to use the Takings Clause instead. But substantive due process
works fine, and can even justify what seems like higher "scrutiny" in
evaluating the connection between means and ends.
Ordinarily, of course, substantive due process involves only minimal scrutiny of governmental action to determine whether it could
conceivably be a rational way to achieve some valid public purpose.8 3
Courts do not want to repeat what they perceive to be earlier mistakes
in which they second-guessed the wisdom of governmental action in
hindsight and held that certain possibly well intentioned actions were
81. See Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. Harris County, 89 F.3d 1481, 1490 n.16 (11th
Cir. 1996) (suggesting that an arbitrary or irrational regulation is not a taking if
it does not make the property worthless, but that the regulation nevertheless
may deny substantive due process).
82. See, e.g., Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1269-70 (E.D. Wis.
1998) (concluding that Seventh Circuit does not allow substantive due process
claims for arbitrary deprivations of property rights).
83. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) ("But the law
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional."); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1119
(10th Cir. 1991) ("Absent invidious discrimination, the presence of a suspect
class, or infringement of a fundamental interest, courts have limited their review
of quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial zoning decisions in the face of a substantive
due process challenge to determining whether the decision was 'arbitrary and
capricious.'"); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 938 (Tex. 1998) ("A
generally applicable zoning ordinance will survive a substantive due process
challenge if it is designed to accomplish an objective within the government's police power and if a rational relationship exists between the ordinance and its
purpose.").
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not reasonable means of achieving some public purpose.8 4 So courts

generally assume that political accountability and other protections
ensure that the government must have had some rational reason for
taking action, and should be allowed to exercise its judgment in pursuing public objectives.8 5 A court will invalidate governmental action
under substantive due process only when it can see no way the government could have thought that its action was a rational way to achieve
some valid public purpose.8 6
But that is in the ordinary case. In the ordinary case, the mere fact
that the government took action is reason enough to defer to its judgment about how to pursue the public interest. When the government
imposes an exaction, however, courts do not have the same reason to
defer to the government's judgment. The mere form of the government's action creates legitimate judicial concern that the action is unreasonable. For example, in the ordinary case the government might
restrict development of houses along a public beach as in Nollan.
When an owner asks for a permit to build a bigger house, the government might deny the permit because of certain public interests. If the
owner complains, a court should defer to the government's judgment
about the public interest and how to further that interest. But in the
exaction situation, the government establishes a regulatory restriction, then offers to waive the restriction if the owner will give the government some property interest. A court no longer has the assurance
that the government itself has judged that the regulation is in the
public interest, because the government has not actually enforced the
regulation. In fact, the government has offered to waive it. So one of
the primary reasons for deferring in the ordinary case-the fact that
the government itself has made ajudgment to take some action-does
not support deferring in the exactions case. Not only that, but there is
a special risk that the government has chosen to enforce or relax the
regulation not because of the consequences of the regulation itself, but
in order to get the interest it has requested from the owner. In the
ordinary case, on the other hand, there is no reason to think that the
ultimate choice to enforce or relax the regulation is based on anything
84. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,

470 U.S. 451, 477-78 (1985) (proclaiming judicial unwillingness to "assess the
wisdom" of a legislative scheme).
85. See, e.g., id. at 477 (holding that Congress "had absolutely no obligation to select

the scheme that a court later would find to be the fairest, but simply one that was
rational and not arbitrary").
86. This analysis may vary depending on whether the government's action is considered to be judicial or legislative in nature. See, e.g., Jacobs, 927 F.2d at 1120 n.7
("If the application process is determined to be quasi-judicial, courts require that
the articulated basis for the decision have a rational relationship to a legitimate
state interest. If the process is characterized as quasi-legislative, however, the
court need only find a rational reason upon which the decision could have been
based." (citations omitted)).
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other than the benefits and harms of the regulation itself. Nollan
cites this reason for more intrusive examination of governmental actions, although relying on the "substantial" advancement standard:
We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where the actual
conveyance of property is made a condition to the liftng of a land-use restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power
87
objective.

For this reason, courts may reasonably examine more closely
whether an exaction is imposed as a rational way to achieve a valid
public purpose. One could call this "heightened" scrutiny, but really
it's just different scrutiny. A "level" of "scrutiny" really doesn't mean
much except in the context of what one is scrutinizing. I'm not suggesting that courts reviewing exactions should be more willing to second-guess the wisdom of regulatory actions generally. I'm just
suggesting that an exaction itself indicates a possible illegitimate reason for the government's conditional enforcement of the regulation. A
court therefore must determine whether that possible illegitimate reason was the government's actual reason. In other words, usually a
court would just look at the conceivable rational reasons, or the articulated reasons, for enforcing a land-use regulation. In the exactions
case the court does not look any more closely than usual at whether
the regulation is a rational way to achieve a public purpose. For example, the court does not examine any more closely whether preventing larger houses on beachfront property is a rational way to pursue a
public interest in visual access to a public beach. But the character of
an exaction raises a specific question which thus requires a more specific, and thus apparently more intrusive, examination to determine
whether the government conditionally enforced the regulation for the
illegitimate reason suggested by the exaction-to extract some property interest from the owner. The substantive due process version of
the restated Nollan theory therefore would not require a court to find
"rough proportionality" between some public interest and the purpose
for a land-use regulation in the ordinary case. But when the regulation is conditionally waived in order to get some property interest from
the owner, the court should look for a nexus and rough proportionality
to determine whether the illegitimate reason suggested by the exaction is truly the government's reason for its action.
Some might say that even an extortionate exaction does not deny
substantive due process because property owners have no property
right to land-use permits. Some courts have held that when a property owner does not have a right to receive a building permit, then
depriving the owner of that permit is not a deprivation of property at
87. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
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all, let alone a deprivation without due process.8 8 Regardless of
whether this reasoning is valid in procedural due process cases, it does
not make sense in the exactions context. The theoretical justification
for zoning laws accepts that property owners have a property interest
in using their property as they choose. If owners simply had no property right to use their property without the government's permission,
Euclid would have been a very different opinion. The Supreme Court
would have simply said that one has no such property right, so a city
does not deprive owners of substantive due process when it imposes
zoning laws, regardless of whether they further any legitimate public
purpose. But the Supreme Court instead approved zoning laws because the articulated public interests underlying such a use of the police power outweigh the individual's right to use his or her property.S9
At the same time, however, the Court acknowledged that when zoning
laws "come to be concretely applied to particular premises, including
those of the appellee, or to particular conditions, or to be considered in
connection with specific complaints, some of them, or even many of
them, may be found to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable" and
thus in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.90 This is the point of Nectow, which followed shortly after Euclid. The Court in Nectow held that the application of a zoning law to
prevent commercial use of certain property violated the Due Process
Clause because the application of the zoning law did not "bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."9 1 The Court did not question whether the owner had a property
right to use its property for commercial purposes, because a land-use
restraint that does not have such a "substantial relation" to legitimate
state interests invariably deprives the owner of property rights. The
legal foundation of land-use regulation thus recognizes that a regulation deprives an owner of property without substantive due process
whenever the regulation does not further a legitimate state interest.

88. See, e.g., Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1374 (11th Cir. 1993)
("First, it must be determined whether there has been a deprivation of a federal
constitutionally protected interest, and secondly, whether the deprivation, if any,
is the result of an abuse of governmental power sufficient to raise an ordinary tort
to the stature of a constitutional violation." (quoting Rymar v. Douglas County,
764 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1985))); Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 258
(11th Cir.1989) (holding that property owners did not have a property interest in
temporary certificate of occupancy).
89. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
90. Id.
91. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
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IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE THEORY
A. The Exacted Interest Need Not Be a Taking
One consequence of the restated Nollan theory would be that property owners can avoid extortionate exactions regardless of whether
the exacted interest would be a taking if imposed independently.
Nollan and Dolan both seem to say that an exaction may be
avoided only if directly taking the exacted interest would have been an
uncompensated taking of private property. Nollan begins its analysis
by declaring that taking a lateral easement would be a compensable
taking, then questioning whether "requiring it to be conveyed as a
condition for issuing a land-use permit alters the outcome." 92 Dolan
similarly observes at the beginning of its analysis that requiring dedication of land along the creek would ordinarily be a taking.9 3 Dolan's
unconstitutional conditions theory, of course, requires that the exaction would be a taking on its own, because otherwise the government
would not be asking the owner to give up a constitutional right to just
compensation in exchange for a permit.9 4 Some courts since Dolan
have therefore suggested that even unrelated or disproportionate exactions are constitutional if directly taking the exacted property would
not be a taking.9 5
The restated Nollan theory, on the other hand, invalidates unrelated or disproportionate exactions regardless of whether directly taking the exacted interest would be a compensable taking. Maybe
Justice Scalia observed that requiring the lateral easement would be a
taking because he was actually thinking about unconstitutional conditions. But otherwise, his observation was formally irrelevant. My
version of the theory invalidates the underlying land-use regulation
because conditionally enforcing the regulation only if the owner won't
surrender a property interest makes extorting the owner's property
the only purpose of applying the regulation. Any unrelated or disproportionate exaction, whether it would be a taking or not, thus indicates the government's illegitimate purpose for applying the
regulation.
92. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
93. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994).
94. See id. at 385 ("[The government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right-here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken
for a public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the govern-

ment where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.").
95. See Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that
Nollan and Dolan would apply to a per tenant cash fee only if the fee would be a
taking if directly imposed); Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 439 (Cal.
1996) (declaring that the "heightened scrutiny" of Nollan and Dolan apply only
when the condition would be an uncompensated taking of private property).
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This may be the most important difference between the unconstitutional conditions theory and the restated Nollan theory. A governmental action may be extortionate regardless of whether the
government could acquire the extorted thing by legitimate means instead. The abuse of regulatory power is the real objection to extortionate exactions. Applying a regulation only to extort value from the
property owner, rather than on good faith consideration of its merits
in the particular case, abuses the regulatory power.
Of course, invalidating a permit condition may seem pointless if
the government can directly take the required interest anyway. The
government would just have to formally separate the two actions, deciding the permit application and separately taking the desired interest from the owner. But there may be situations in which the
government would not directly take the desired interest, even though
it could constitutionally.
For instance, political realities or concerns may prevent direct action. Say a county planning board was tempted to use conditions to
determine governmental policy outside the usual boundaries of its authority. The planning board was dissatisfied with the performance of
a law enforcement officer whose employment was at will. So when
that officer asked for a land-use permit, the planning board decided to
conditionally grant the permit if the officer would resign from his job.
The county could have directly and summarily fired the officer without
violating the officer's constitutional rights,96 so the planning board's
condition was not an unconstitutional condition. But the planning
board itself could not ordinarily fire the officer, because the county
sheriff has the authority to make such decisions. Of course, this example is extreme because the statutory grant of power to the planning
board would surely prevent such an abuse anyway. But even if a statute did not properly limit the planning board's activities, such a condition would clearly abuse the power to regulate land uses even though
the condition did not require the surrender of a constitutional right,
and even if firing the officer was in the public's legitimate interest.
A planning commission might abuse its power for less unusual reasons as well. For example, suppose that a city council's zoning regulations specify certain limitations on the size and number of commercial
signs. Assuming that the planning commission had general authority
to impose exactions in granting development permits, the commission
might be tempted to usurp the city council's legislative role. If the
commission felt that the city council should have restricted signs even
further, the commission might use exactions to require owners of com96. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-47 (1976) (holding that North Carolina law did not give policeman a property interest in continued employment).
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mercial property to voluntarily limit the size and number of signs beyond what the statute required.
Besides usurping power from other government bodies, a planning
commission also might improperly use exactions to avoid public accountability for or resistance to its actions. Rather than passing some
controversial amendment to the zoning code, a planning commission
might try to minimize the controversy by applying a new de facto standard to any new development as a condition, no matter how unrelated.
Not only could such a strategy defuse public resistance, it might also
avoid procedural requirements such as holding public hearings. The
restated Nollan theory would prevent such abuses of the regulatory
power.
B.

Cash Fees Must Be Proportional and Related

Another important implication of the restated Nollan theory is
that even cash impact fees must be roughly proportional to the public
impact of any land use that is conditioned upon payment of such fees.
Governments have used two types of cash fees: impact fees and
fees in lieu of property dedications. The latter type of fee gives a landowner the choice between dedicating a specified amount of land or
paying the market value of that land. The land or the cash may be
used for parks, schools, and other public improvements theoretically
required by the proposed land use. Impact fees do not give the owner
the choice of dedicating land, but otherwise serve the same
97
purposes.
When cash fees are not significantly greater than the public costs
created by a proposed land use, fees certainly are constitutional under
any theory. However, some have suggested that Nollan and Dolan
would not invalidate even a disproportionately large cash fee, emphasizing the Supreme Court's observations that the exactions in those
cases involved physical intrusions. They therefore maintain that Nollan and Dolan apply only to exactions of real property.9 8
97. See Donald L. Connors & Michael E. High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions:
From Dedicationto Linkage, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 71-72 (1987); John J.
Delaney et al., The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for ValidatingSubdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAw & CONrmP. PROBS. 139,
141-43 (1987); Noreen A. Murphy, Note, The Viability of Impact FeesAfter Nollan
and Dolan, 31 NEw ENG. L. REv. 203, 204-05 (1996).
98. See Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991)
(suggesting that Nollan does not apply to payment of fees designated to offset
housing problems associated with new development); McCarthy v. City of
Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (questioning application of Dolan to impact fees); Robert H. Freflich, The Supreme Court and State and Local Government: Small Change for a Changing Court, 26 URB. LAw. 623, 689 (1994) ("[IThe
most likely conclusion is that Dolan only applies to dedications of land. .. ");
Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek, Thou Shalt Not Take Title Without Ads-
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These courts and commentators are probably right under Dolan's
unconstitutional conditions theory. Although the Supreme Court has
not yet clearly resolved the issue, "taking" cash by imposing a fee
probably cannot be a taking requiring just compensation. In Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel,99 Justice O'Connor and three other justices held
that imposition of liability for coal miners' lifetime health benefits was
a taking without just compensation.ioo Justice Kennedy concurred in
the result, but expressly disagreed that imposing financial liability
could be a taking when it does not "operate upon or alter an identified
property interest, and it is not applicable to or measured by a property
interest."' 0 ' Justice Breyer and three other dissenting justices agreed
with Justice Kennedy that the Takings Clause does not apply to taking cash by imposing financial liability, although it may apply to taking cash from a specifically identified fund or account.i 0 2 A majority
therefore apparently would hold that imposing a cash fee, rather than
taking cash from some specific fund or account, could never be a taking, but must be analyzed under substantive due process and other
constitutional doctrines. If so, granting a land-use permit on the condition that the owner pay a cash fee would never be an unconstitutional condition requiring surrender of a constitutional right to just
compensation.
The restated Nollan theory, on the other hand, clearly invalidates
unrelated or disproportionately large cash fees. That is simply because it doesn't matter what unrelated or disproportional concession
the government seeks to obtain in return for a land-use permit. If the
government applies a permit requirement only for the purpose of extracting something unrelated or disproportional to the concerns that
would justify denial, the government's application of the permit requirement does not advance any legitimate purpose, but merely generates income.

99.
100.
101.
102.

quate Planning: The Takings Equation After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 27 URB.
LAw. 187, 202 (1995) ("Dolan will, or should be, limited to land dedications, as
opposed to cash equivalent or other types of exactions."); Sam D. Starritt & John
H. McClanahan, Comment, Land-Use Planning and Takings: The Viability of
ConditionalExactions to Conserve Open Space in the Rocky Mountain West After
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), 30 LAND & WATER L. Ray. 415,
460-62 (1995) ("While Dolan may appear to provide a viable standard upon which
to evaluate the constitutionality of an impact fee, gauging a money exaction
under rough proportionality, and its concomitant burden shift, does not correspond with Dolan'sreasoning.").
118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998).
See id. at 2149-53.
Id. at 2154.
See id. at 2161-63. The Court had earlier expressed doubt that a fee could be a
taking because, "[ulnlike real or personal property, money is fungible." United
States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1989). But the Court had held that
taking interest on specific interpleader fimds was a taking without compensation.
See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-65 (1980).
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A cash fee clearly could be disproportional to the public costs created by a land use. In some circumstances a cash fee might be unrelated as well. Generally a government could easily establish a nexus
between a cash impact fee and a land-use restriction, since cash can be
used to mitigate any public burdens that may result from a land use.
Still, an impact fee would be unrelated if the cash were not at least
generally used to mitigate the public burdens created by the development. Since cash is fungible, it shouldn't matter whether the cash is
specifically put into an account to offset public costs arising from the
land use. But if the government does not actually offset those public
costs, whether from specifically allocated funds or general funds, then
even a cash impact fee would not have a nexus to the public burdens
that would justify denial of the permit. Instead, those public burdens
would have just been used as an excuse to raise cash for other
purposes.
C.

The Government Cannot Constitutionally Reverse the
Exaction Process

The restated Nollan theory also prevents another extortionate
strategy that the unconstitutional conditions theory probably allows.
Since the unconstitutional conditions theory applies only when a city
directly conditions permit approval on surrender of a property interest, the city might instead reverse the process, condemning the desired property interest and offering the permit as just compensation.
As one article suggests, a city could condemn the property and offer
the owner either the permit the owner seeks or the fair market value
of the condemned property in cash. 10 3 The owner will presumably
choose the permit as long as the city makes sure that the condemned
property is worth significantly less than the permit is worth to the
owner. In that case, the city has not put conditions on any governmental benefit, yet the effect is the same: knowing the greater value
of the permit to the owner, the city uses the permit requirement to get
more than compensation for public costs resulting from the permit.1 0 4
For example, assume that a business owner requests a permit to
develop her property in a way that will be worth $25,000 in increased
revenues and such. However, the permit will only cost the city $5000
in extra water, sewer, police, transportation, and other costs. The proportionality and nexus requirements are supposed to prevent the city
103. See Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, "Paying"for the Change: Using Eminent Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REv.
1801, 1816-17 (1995).
104. See id. at 1817-18 (concluding that by this strategy, the Coastal Commission in
Nollan "would have succeeded in obtaining precisely what it sought and was denied by the Court in Nollan: an easement in exchange for a development
permit").
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from using the threat of denial to acquire property interests other
than those that will somehow reduce or eliminate the city's costs,
without resulting in a significant profit for the city. A significant
profit would make the exaction disproportional, and merely offsetting
the public costs with a $5000 profit from some unrelated property
would have no nexus or "essential relationship" to the costs created by
the requested development.
Nevertheless, assume the city wants an easement over the owner's
property. The fair market value of the easement is $15,000. The city
wants the easement for legitimate planning reasons, but those planning concerns are unrelated to the concerns that could justify denying
the permit. The city therefore knows that it cannot condition the permit on granting an easement or it will have imposed an unconstitutional condition on the permit. So instead the city condemns the
easement and offers as compensation either $15,000 in cash or the desired permit. The owner knows, of course, that if she chooses the cash
the city is not about to turn around and grant the permit as well.
Since the permit is worth more than $15,000 to the owner, she takes
the permit as compensation.
In this example, the city may not have imposed an unconstitutional condition on the permit. First, the city might say it hasn't imposed any condition on the permit at all. The city could still grant the
permit; it is simply giving the owner the choice of compensation for
the condemned property. This argument is unconvincing, however.
The city at least implied that the owner could receive the permit only
if she accepted it as compensation for the condemned easement.
Otherwise the owner would have little reason to accept the deal if she
could receive cash compensation and still receive the permit as well.
Practically, the city has implicitly conditioned the permit on accepting
it as just compensation for the condemned easement.
However, this condition may not be unconstitutional because it
may not require the owner to surrender a constitutional right. The
owner does not have to surrender her right to compensation in order
105
Of
to receive the permit, since the permit is the compensation.
course, the owner does have to give up cash compensation for the condemned property in order to receive the government benefit. If cash
compensation were a constitutional right, then simply offering the
permit in exchange for waiver of that right would be unconstitutional.106 Some state constitutions do create a right to cash compen105. See id. at 1853.
106. Kendall and Ryan disagree. Although they acknowledge the weakness of their
argument, they argue that the government may require giving up a constitutional right to cash compensation in exchange for a permit because the government has a legitimate reason for requiring the surrender of that right. That
reason, they say, is that the government cannot afford to provide both cash corn-
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sation for condemned property, but the United States Constitution
probably does not.07 In most cases, then, the city could thus achieve
its extortionate goal without imposing an unconstitutional condition.
The restated Nollan theory, on the other hand, would invalidate
this extortionate scheme. In essence, this compensation scheme
would take from the owner the very value that the government then
offers as compensation. So while the offer to compensate for taken
property with a permit might not be a taking, requiring the permit in
the first place is a taking.
Requiring the permit-in other words, the application of land-use
restrictions in the particular circumstances-is a taking because the
government requires it for some reason other than substantially advancing legitimate state interests. The government offers the permit
only if the owner will accept it as compensation for taken property. If
the owner will not accept it as compensation, the government necessarily implies, the government will deny the permit. So the only actual reason for the government's decision to grant or deny the permit
is the owner's decision whether to accept the permit as compensation
for some other property right the government has condemned. If the
owner accepts it as compensation, the government will grant the permit, but if the owner won't accept it as compensation, the government
will deny it. This is essentially the same illegitimate purpose that
makes the underlying land-use restriction invalid in the ordinary exaction situation.10 8 For example, in the Nollan situation suppose the
Coastal Commission condemns the lateral easement then offers either
the building permit or some cash amount that it figures is substantially less valuable to the owner than the building permit. The Compensation and the development permit, which will cause the government to incur
additional costs. See id. at 1854-57. As Nollan suggests, a condition may require
the surrender of a constitutional right in exchange for a government benefit if
surrendering the constitutional right will serve the same basic purpose as denial
of the benefit would serve. In other words, the condition must somehow mitigate
the negative effects of granting the benefit. See Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987). In Nollan, for example, a condition would
have to mitigate the impairment of visual access in order to be constitutional. An
owner's acceptance ofnonmonetary compensation rather than cash compensation
would not mitigate the impairment of visual access at all, nor would it mitigate
other negative effects of proposed development. The only way in which it might
have that effect, and therefore have an essential nexus, is if the government then
used the cash saved to ameliorate the negative effects of the permit that it
granted as compensation. But that would be as if the Coastal Commission in
Nollan had tried to justify its exaction on the theory that it could sell the lateral
easement and use the cash proceeds to acquire a viewing spot from the road or
otherwise improve visual access. The Court's opinion clearly enough indicates
that the condition must of its own nature have some mitigating effect, serving the
same purpose as denial of the permit.
107. See Kendall & Ryan, supra note 103, at 837-43.
108. See supra pp. 358-59.
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mission necessarily implies that it will grant the permit only if the
Nollans accept it as compensation for the easement. The Commission
would thus apply the land-use restriction not to advance any legitimate state interest, but to create cash value to use as just compensation. In both cases the government's only reason for its permit
decision is to create exchange value, whether for a "voluntary" exchange in the actual case or for an exchange by condemnation in the
hypothetical case. The government may use the exchange value in order to acquire something that has legitimate public value, but that
doesn't make the permit decision legitimate any more than it would
make more typical forms of extortion legitimate.' 0 9
Some might say that this incorrectly assumes the government will
deny the permit if the owner doesn't accept it as compensation. In
most cases, after all, the government may easily justify going either
way on a permit application. This is the same objection that I discussed above in defending the general theory,1 0 but in this situation
refuting the objection requires a little more explanation. In the ordinary situation, the government plainly declares that it will issue the
permit only if the owner surrenders the specified property interest.
The government's reason for deciding which way to go, even if either
way were defensible, is clearly the owner's decision whether to surrender the property. If the government tries to use the permit as compensation, however, the government does not have to declare so openly
that it will deny the permit if the owner does not accept it as compensation. Of course, the owner would not accept the deal if the owner
thought that she could refuse and the government would still make a
fair decision on the merits of the permit application without any connection to the condemned property. So in order for the strategy to
work, the government has to at least imply that the owner will get the
permit only if she accepts it as compensation for the condemned property. Furthermore, the permit would have no actual compensatory
value if the owner would have received the permit anyway. If the government thus decides to grant or deny a permit on the basis of the
owner's willingness to accept it as compensation for condemned property, rather than on some judgment about the effect of the prospective
land use on the public interest, the government has applied the permit
requirement in a way that does not advance a legitimate state
interest.
Some might argue that merely avoiding the risk of denial is valuable compensation, which the owner may accept as sufficient. But
while avoiding risk may be valuable, the government can use it as
compensation only if it can legitimately create the risk in the first
place. For example, the government could not compensate someone by
109. See supra pp. 361-62.
110. See supra p. 359.
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creating then removing a risk that it will falsely accuse a property
owner of a crime. The owner might choose to avoid the risk rather
than taking some alternative cash offer, but that doesn't legitimize the
value of avoiding the risk. The value of avoiding risk itself therefore
cannot independently justify the government's action. The permit's
value can justly compensate only if the government could legitimately
deny the permit if the owner turned down the exchange offer, but still
could legitimately grant the permit as compensation.
But the government can't legitimately do that. Again, the government's condition makes it clear that the government's decision to
grant in the one case, but deny in the other case, is based on the
owner's decision whether to accept the permit as compensation for
condemned property. In short, the only reason for the decision is
whether the permit can create cash value with which the government
can acquire property by eminent domain. Such a purpose is not a legitimate state interest.
Therefore, the value of the permit, even if accepted by the owner as
compensation, has been taken from the owner in the first place. The
permit has value only because the government applied a permit requirement in a way that did not substantially advance a legitimate
state interest. The permit requirement itself therefore is a taking-or
a denial of substantive due process-as applied in the particular case.
The result is that, if a city tried such a scheme, the owner could
accept the cash compensation for the condemned property, then either
invalidate as an uncompensated taking the land-use restriction that
the permit would have relaxed, or recover compensation for that taking. The compensation would be equal to the value of the prospective
land use forbidden without the permit. So in effect the government
would either have to grant the permit or pay compensation for denying the permit.
However, the restated Nollan theory does still allow a similar
strategy that is not extortionate. That is, when an owner requests a
building permit, the government can impose a cash impact fee but offer to accept some property interest instead of the cash. If the property interest is worth less to the owner than the cash, the owner would
probably convey the property interest voluntarily. Such an exaction
would not be extortionate as long as the cash fee is roughly proportional to the public burdens created by the proposed land use and the
government does actually mitigate the public burdens, establishing a
nexus between the cash exaction and the public burdens."'l In that
case the property interest conveyed in place of cash would not have to
be related to the public burdens, because the government is simply
accepting the property as an alternative to cash. The government's
111. See supra Part IV.B.
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willingness to accept cash rather than the property indicates that the
government is indeed imposing the condition only to mitigate the costs
of the proposed land use, since it will not necessarily receive the property and since the cash impact fee is roughly proportional to those
public costs.
This is not a weakness in the restated Nollan theory, because such
a strategy is not extortionate. The government would not extract from
the owner some extra value beyond just the value necessary to roughly
offset the public costs of the proposed land use. The objection to offering cash or a permit as just compensation is that it allows the government to receive some value beyond the public costs-to instead
capture some or all of the extra value of the permit to the owner. But
if the government asks for no more than an amount of cash roughly
proportional to the public costs, then it doesn't matter whether the
owner pays that directly or by giving the city some property interest
that it would otherwise have to buy with cash that will now be available to pay those public costs. The cash amount is an upper limit to
the amount the owner may be forced to pay, and that amount is justified by the public costs of the proposed land use.
D.

Requiring an "Individualized Determination" Makes
Sense

The restated Nollan theory also better justifies the Supreme
Court's apparent requirement that a governmental entity must make
sufficient individualized factual findings on the record before imposing
an exaction. Although Dolan does not directly say so, Dolan suggests
that the government cannot justify an exaction by gathering evidence
after the owner challenges it. For example, rather than just stating
an evidentiary standard that a court must find satisfied at trial, Dolan
says that "the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent
to the impact of the proposed development.""12 Similarly, the Court
says that "the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in
support of the dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond
the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand generated."113 These comments suggest that it is not enough
for a city to prove the required relationship and proportionality at
trial-the city must actually make its own factual findings meeting
this standard at the time it makes the decision to impose the exaction.
The unconstitutional conditions theory of Dolan should not require
such an individualized determination by the government. The Court's
theory for invalidating unrelated or disproportionate exactions is that
112. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
113. Id. at 395-96.
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the government conditions a land-use permit on the surrender of the
right to just compensation for taken property. This analysis should be
entirely objective. If the government did impose such a condition, it
doesn't matter whether the government meant to do so. Likewise, a
proportional and related exaction is not an unconstitutional condition
simply because the government did not make sufficient factual findings to establish its proportionality and relationship before imposing
the exaction. An unconstitutional condition exists because of the objective connection between benefit and right, not because of the government's apparent intent or because of any procedural deficiency.
Among other possible reasons, one reason that the analysis should be
entirely objective is that an unconstitutional condition is wrongful because of the predicament in which it puts the citizen, not because of
any wrongful intent or procedure by the government.
Likewise, a taking is also generally an objective fact about the
character and extent of a government intrusion on property. The government's intentions and procedures do not determine whether a particular action is a taking. However, the restated Nollan theory helps
explain and justify requiring governments themselves to make individualized findings before imposing exactions. According to this theory, a court must decide whether the underlying land-use restriction
was applied to substantially advance a legitimate state interest,
either because of substantive due process or the Takings Clause. This
requires the court to consider the relationship of the government's action to public purposes, rather than just the character or degree of
imposition on property rights.
Although substantial advancement is an objective fact as well,
courts may reasonably defer to the judgment of local governments because of the well-recognized risks of judging the wisdom of regulation
in hindsight. If the government reasonably thought that the exaction
was a sensible way to mitigate the negative effects of a proposed land
use, the court should not invalidate the exaction simply because it
seems to the court in hindsight that the government was wrong. This,
of course, is the basic reason for deferential substantive due process
review.
Dolan's requirement of individualized fact-finding by the government makes more sense from this perspective. Courts are trying to
determine whether a government imposed an exaction merely to extract some property right from the owner without paying for it, or
whether the government imposed the exaction because it reasonably
believed that doing so would ameliorate public costs of the proposed
land use. If the government makes findings demonstrating the required relationship and rough proportionality, a court may properly
conclude that the government's exaction did substantially advance a
legitimate state interest, without second-guessing the government's
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findings. But otherwise the court may fairly conclude that the government opportunistically imposed the exaction to extort some property
right from the owner.
V.

CONCLUSION

The restated Nollan theory prevents at least three types of extortionate acts that other theories may allow: exacting something unrelated or disproportional when directly taking it would not be a
compensable taking, imposing unrelated or disproportionate cash impact fees, and compensating for takings with land-use permits. Just
as important, however, is that the theory avoids the logical gaps, inconsistencies, and weaknesses in alternative explanations for the
Court's nexus and proportionality requirements. The restated Nollan
theory invalidates unrelated and disproportionate exactions for the
common-sense reason that the government thereby misuses its regulatory power by conditionally enforcing a land-use regulation merely
because the owner will not surrender some property interest, rather
than because enforcement will further the public purposes that justify
land-use planning. Acceptance of this theory therefore could both
more fully prevent extortionate exactions and help clarify and simplify
an unclear and complex area of the law.

